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The Estalishment of Lesotho Congress for Democracy: 
Implications for the 1998 General Election
Pontso Sekatle*
Lesotho politics has since independence been characterised by drama and intrigue. The 
la te s t  drama unfolded in June 1997 with the resignation o f the Prime Minister, Dr Ntsu 
Mokhehle, from  the then governing Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) which had won 
a ll the 65 constituencies in the 1993 general elections. The Prime Minister announced 
th a t he had form ed a new political party, Lesotho Congress fo r  Democracy (LCD) 
which replaced the BCP as the ruling party. The abrupt departure o f Ntsu Mokhehle 
from a party he had led since its inception in 1952 brought to an end a protracted 
power struggle and succession crisis afflicting the BCP. Ntsu Mokhehle's move 
generated debates which in turn contributed significantly to a deeper understanding o f  
parliamentary democracy in general and Lesotho’s Constitution in particular.
Introduction
On Monday 9 June 1997, Ntsu Mokhehle, the Prime Minister of  Lesotho and 
leader of the then governing Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), announced that 
he had formed a new political party , Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). 
He made this announcem ent at a press conference held in the National 
Assembly. The establishment o f  the LCD was a sequel to a resolution by about 
one thousand followers o f  Ntsu Mokhehle who had gathered at the 
Cooperatives College in Maseru on Saturday 7 June 1997 in response to his 
call for such a gathering to devise a solution to problems afflicting the BCP. 
The formation o f  the L C D  brought to an end the BCP government and 
heralded an abrupt and radical change to the leadership o f  a party formed in 
1952 and led by Ntsu M okhehle since its inception. The BCP had won all the 
65 constituencies in the 1993 general election1.
Ntsu Mokhehle’s m ove to form a new political party sent shock waves and 
confusion among his opponents within and outside the BCP. Some of them
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argued that he had to resign from the premiership because his action was 
unconstitutional and morally reprehensible as he had been sworn in as Prime 
Minister in his capacity as leader o f  the BCP. The BCP and some opposition 
parties (Basotho National Party, Marematlou Freedom Party, United 
Democratic Party, Hareeng Basotho Party, Labour Party, Lesotho Education 
Party, and Sefate Democratic Union) formed a coalition intended to force the 
Prime Minister to resign. The coalition called a national "stay away" on 16 
June 1997 but this failed to materialise as all the people ignored the call and 
went about their businesses as usual. On the same day the coalition staged a 
march to the palace to present a m emorandum imploring the King to dismiss 
the Prime Minister, dissolve parliament and organise new elections. The 
memorandum, signed by the Secretary General o f  the BCP, G .M . Kolisang, 
stated:
T he form ation o f  the Lesotho C ongress for D em ocracy as a political party in 
parliament is not only a m anipulation o f  the dem ocratic process, a travesty o f  
justice hut also a betrayal o f  the trust that has been reposed upon him as 
Leader o f  the Basutoland C ongress Party and warrants the applicability o f  the 
convention that Dr Ntsu M okhehle resign as Prime M inister (sic). W e request 
the King to see  to it that dem ocratic n ile  is restored otherw ise the people will 
have no option other than to return their m lc by use o f  all peaceful endeavours 
(sic).
On 2 July the Basotho National Party (BNP) led another protest march to the 
palace, joined by other members of the anti-Mokhehle coalition. The 
memorandum handed at the Palace by the BNP also requested the King to 
dissolve Parliament and the government. Similar marches were led to the 
Palace by the Marematlou Freedom  Party (MFP) and women belonging to the 
coalition parties on 24 July and 17 August 1997, respectively . On 17 August 
1997 the marchers were addressed, among others, by Mrs Sandy Kanji and 
Mrs Mohau Pheko representing the Botswana National Front (BNF) and the 
South African Coalition o f  W omen (SACW), respectively.
The Lesotho Council o f  Non-Governmental Organisations (LCN) supported the 
stance ot the anti-Mokhehle coalition. After its two day extraordinary general 
meeting organised specifically to debate political developments in Lesotho, the 
LCN stated that "the move by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle is politically and 
morally reprehensible". T he LCN further stated that this action required the
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holding o f  elections by an independent electoral commission not later than 
March 1998.
This paper discusses the political drama which has unfolded in Lesotho with 
the resignation o f  Dr Ntsu Mokhehle from the BCP and the formation o f  the 
LCD which emerged as the ruling party. The paper will focus specifically on 
four issues: first, parliamentary democracy and representation; second, the 
legality or o therwise o f  Ntsu M okhehle’s action; third, the reasons that might 
have led to the form ation o f  the LCD and; fourth, the implications of these 
latest developments for Lesotho politics and the 1998 general elections.
1 Parliamentary Dem ocracy and Representation
Lesotho is a W estminster type o f  parliamentary democracy characterised hy the 
follow ing: a head o f  state whose functions are largely ceremonial and who has 
limited legal and political powers; a head o f  government (political executive) 
selected by members o f  the legislature and who should resign if they withdraw 
their support.
Parliamentary dem ocracy falls within the realm of  liberal representative 
democracy. T he basic features o f  this system include individual rights, 
universal participation, political equality, majority rule and government 
responsiveness to public opinion (Janda et al, 1989; Ball, 1993; Mill, 1951).
There are two basic theories o f  representation. These are th e  delegate and 
trustee theories. Hague et.al. put it succinctly:
The delegate is c lo se ly  bound to refleet the w ishes o f  those who elected him  
or her. D elegates are typ ically ‘m andated’ , that is, given instructions to carry 
out. T he trustee, by contrast, uses independent judgem ent on behalf o f  the 
voters. T he trustee is free to ignore the vo ters’ v iew s, but does so at his or her 
peril (H ague: 1992 , 292).
The delegate/mandate theory postulates that a delegate lacks an independent 
function. He/she must follow the instructions o f  the constituency to the letter. 
When confronted with new issues the delegate must always seek mandate from 
the constituency. T he other approach, trustee/independent was best stated by 
Edmund Burke in the Eighteenth Century. He contended that a trustee
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representative should exercise his/her independent judgement even when that 
judgement differs from the wishes o f  his/her constituency. For Burke, priority 
in decision making must be given to issues o f  national interest over those of 
individual constituencies (this assumes that these can be easily separated). The 
trustee/independent representative should therefore give issues o f  national 
interest first priority when they clash with those of  the constituency. However, 
failure to consult may be one o f  the key reasons for not being re-elected.
In practice representatives tend to blend the two styles. They are given a 
mandate during the election period. But it is also assumed that as 
representatives they can make suitable judgements on behalf of  their 
constituents. Hence they are not expected to consult constituencies on each and 
every matter tabled for discussion in the legislature.
A distinction must be drawn between practices under proportional 
representation, particularly the party list system, on the one hand and 
majoritarian systems on the other. Under proportional representation votes are 
cast in favour o f  a political party and not in favour o f  a particular candidate. 
In the 1994 South African election members o f  the National and Provincial 
legislatures were elected on party lists. They represent political parties and not 
constituencies. This explains why a representative who resigns from his/her 
political party, as it happened with Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer, loses 
his/her seat in parliament.
In majoritarian systems members o f  parliament represent constituencies and not 
political parties. This is also referred to as areal representation. Under this 
system a representative who resigns or is expelled from a political party retains 
his/her seat in parliament because he/she represents a constituency and not a 
political party. This means that majoritarian systems practice the 
trustee/independent type o f  representation more that the delegate/mandate type. 
Hence candidates have the freedom to act independently to the extent that they 
may vote against proposals that have been made by their own political parties 
or vote with a different party. The extreme o f  such independence is portrayed 
through the practice of crossing the floor. A representative who crosses the 
floor is not recalled or asked to resign from parliament.
Crossing the floor occurs all the time in many parliamentary democracies. A 
comprehensive list of members o f  the House o f  Commons who crossed the
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floor from  1900 to 1983 in Britain has been compiled by D. Butler and G. 
Butler (1986: 233-239). For in s ta n c e , th e  p a r lia m en t of 1979-83 record ed  31 
floor crossings, the highest num ber since 1900. 25 o f  them crossed from the 
Labour Party in one year, 1981, and joined the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP). The SD P was formed by former Labour Cabinet Ministers in 1981. 
The overall num ber o f  Mem bers o f  the House o f  Commons who changed 
allegiance from  the Labour Party in the 1979-83 Parliament was 29 out of  269 
(Butler and Butler). In Lesotho the representative o f  Qeme Constituency, 
Bofihla Nkuebe, who had been elected as an independent candidate in 1993 
formed a political party , Sefate Democratic Union, immediately after joining 
the National Assem bly. He did not resign his seat in th e National Assembly 
because o f  crossing to his own newly formed party.
The reason why representatives are allowed to cross the floor, as explained 
earlier, is because it is believed that they are acting in the best interest o f  their 
constituents. T he  second reason why representatives may cross the floor or 
make decisions that are not necessarily mandated by their constituents is 
because they are elected for a fixed period o f  time without conditions. In other 
words, once elected legislators must exercise independence. But, as stated 
earlier, crossing the floor may contribute to the representative’s failure to be 
re-elected. Which means that a representative must ensure that his/her action 
to cross the floor is supported by the majority o f  people he/she represents.
Another important issue that should be clarified about the Westminster-type of 
parliamentary dem ocracy is the relationship between the parliamentary party 
and the extra-parliamentary party, that is, the relationship between 
representatives and their parties outside parliament. In his study o f  Dutch 
parties, Daalder (1989: 236), concluded that:
the parliam entary groups are in all parties autonom ous organisations, on which  
the extra-parliam entary party can exercise no direct control. Parliamentary 
parties ch o o se  their ow n leader and determ ine their ow n political stand.
A s i m i l a r  conclusion was made back in 1955 by McKenzie in a study o f  British 
part ie s .  McKenzie concluded that despite formal party rules that may dictate 
o th e r w i s e ,  "parliam entary governm ent forces a concentration of power in the 
hands of parliamentarians, whatever the formal party rules", (summarised by 
H ag u e  e t  al: 1992, 237).
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These observations by Daakler and McKenzie are depicted by the practice of 
crossing the floor (explained earlier) common in the Westminster type of 
parliamentary democracies. When representatives cross the floor to join other 
political parties they are indeed ‘choosing their own leaders and determining 
their own political s tand’ contrary to the wishes o f  the parties under which they 
were elected to parliament. As such the resignation or expulsion o f  a Prime 
Minister from the position o f  party leader does not automatically call for 
resignation or expulsion from government. This was confirmed by a Judge 
presiding over the case that had been filed by Ntsu Mokhehle challenging his 
alleged dismissal from  the leadership o f  the BCP. Justice Maqutu stated that:
applicant can rem ain Prime M inister although he might have ceased to he the 
party leader o f  the BC P. T he position o f  Prime M inister depends on the 
support o f  the majority o f  m em bers o f  Parliament who are elected to serve a 
five-year term. T hey can make or unmake Prime M inisters as they see fit. 
Parliament is a national and constitutional organ o f  the State not o f  the
B C P .......M em bers o f  the National A ssem bly who support the Prime M inister
may vote him out o f  o ff ic e  and propose the name o f  som eone e lse  for 
appointm ent as Prime M inister at any tim e in terms o f  Section 87(8) read 
along with Section 87(5)(a) and (7)(e) o f  the Constitution (C IV /A P N /75 /97 ).
The Judge further stated that given the manner in which Parliament operates:
the B .C .P . as a political party docs not feature proiaincntly. Its m em bers are 
recognised by the Constitution as individuals despite the use o f  the term  
political party in the C onstitution. If they choose  to be under the party whip 
and act co llec tiv ely , it is their choice. The party does not feature by law in the 
m aking or the unm aking o f  the Prim e M inister. Party participation and 
discipline in Parliament am ong m em bers o f  Parliament is an internal affair o f  
the political party. Therefore rem oving applicant from the leadership o f  the 
B .C .P  would be personally hum iliating to applicant, but it would not affect his 
position as Prime M inister as long as the majority o f  the m em bers o f  the 
National A ssem bly support him (C lV /A P N /7 5 /9 7 ) .
In concluding this section we would like to reiterate that the Westminster-type 
ot parliamentary democracy, with its emphasis on the trustee/independent style 
of representation, gives representatives significant independence. This includes 
independence to make and unmake Prime Ministers, independence to vote 
against their parties’ proposals if they so wish, and freedom to cross the floor 
and change allegiance. The Prime M inister’s move to form a new political 
party and crossing to it; the crossing o f  the majority o f  members of the
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National Assembly to the newly formed party, all fall within standard practices 
of the W estminster-type o f  parliamentary democracy. An observation must be 
made, however, that the furore caused by the formation of  LCD shows that 
some people in Lesotho do not understand the principles and practices of 
parliamentary dem ocracy as well as theories o f  representation. The 
parliamentary/extra parliamentary dichotomy is not clear to them. They believe 
that members o f  parliament represent political parties and not constituencies. 
The formation o f  the LC D  has, therefore, been an eye opener because debates 
on the media as well as High Court judgements delivered during the power 
struggle within the BCP, underscore the principles and practices of 
parliamentary dem ocracy and theories o f  representation outlined above.
2 . Is Ntsu M okhehle’s Action Illegal?
The preceding section showed how parliamentary democracy, particularly the 
Westminster type, operates. This section discusses the legality or otherwise of 
Ntsu Mokhehle’s action. T he discussion will draw generally upon the preceding 
section and, specifically the discussion will be based on Lesotho’s Constitution. 
The particular clauses o f  interest are those that explain the appointment o f  the 
Prime Minister and the dissolution o f  Parliament.
The Constitution states in Section 87 (2) that:
The K ing shall appoint as Prime M inister the m em ber o f  the National 
Assem bly w ho appears to the C ouncil o f  State to be the leader o f  the political 
party or coalition  o f  political parties that w ill comm and the support o f  a 
majority o f  the National A ssem bly.
Political analysts and constitutional lawyers contend that the Prime Minister’s 
move does not constitute  a breach o f  L eso tho’s constitution because he is "the 
leader of the political party that commands the support ot the majority of the 
members o f  the National Assembly" as is required by the constitution." The 
support that Ntsu M okhehle  has in the National Assembly was confirmed on
11 June when 40 o f  the 65 members o f  that house passed a motion ot 
confidence in him (Hansard , 11 June 1997). All these 40 members were 
elected to the National Assem bly as BCP candidates in 1993. They have 
crossed the floor to join the LCD . T he crossing ot 40 members from the BCP
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to the LCD means that the latter is now the majority party with 40 members 
while the form er is a minority party with 24 members.
Despite the above, opposition political party leaders such as Vincent Malebo 
o f  the M FP, E.R. Sekhonyana o f  the BNP, Tseliso Makhakhe o f  the BCP, 
consider the ascendancy o f  the LCD and its administration illegitimate 
usurpation o f  power and a coup d ’etat.3 These political leaders and other 
members o f  the anti-LCD coalition have labelled Mokhehle a dictator of the 
Mobutu type.4 The coalition formed by these leaders has attempted to mobilise 
the nation against Dr Ntsu M okhehle’s government, involving and openly 
seeking assistance from foreign diplomatic missions in Maseru, the Southern 
African Development Council - SAD C- (particularly Botswana, Republic of 
South Africa and Z im babwe), the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. These efforts were not successful. For example, the response of the 
British High Comm issioner in Lesotho to the BC P’s request that Britain should 
withhold its recognition o f  the LCD government was that:
Regional and C om m onw ealth  G overnm ents, including the British Governm ent,
do not regard the present Governm ent o f  Lesotho as illegal. (Cited in
M oafrika, 5 Septem ber 1997).
The wide publicity embarked upon by the anti- Mokhehle coalition in the 
region and as further afield as Britain may have been influenced by the 
response to King Letsie I l l ’s coup o f  August 1994. Then the international 
community refused to recognise the illegitimate government and threatened to 
impose sanctions.
The coalition parties have not sought the intervention o f  the judiciary, the 
organ best qualified to address such grievances. They have, instead, called 
upon the king to dissolve Parliament and dissolve Ntsu Mokhehle’s 
government; and set up an interim government which would prepare for the 
forthcoming national elections. As stated in the introduction, these parties have 
marched to the Palace to hand in memoranda on this issue. The Upper House 
of Parliament, Senate, has also called on the King to dissolve Parliament 
which, in essence, means dismissing the government. Like the coalition. Senate 
wants an interim governm ent to lead the country during preparations for 
elections.
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For reasons that remain unclear, the King sought legal opinion from one of 
South A frica’s constitutional experts, W .H . Olivier SC, on this matter. 
Olivier’s opinion and advice to the King was that:
(a) by form ing a new  political party, Dr M okhehle did not vacate the 
off ic e  o f  Prime M inister;
(b) D r M ok h eh le’s form ing o f  a new  party as such does not entitle His 
M ajesty to rem ove him from the office  o f  Prime M inister;
(c) D r M ok h eh le’s form ing o f  a new party does not entitle His Majesty 
to d isso lv e  Parliament;
(d) as D r M okhehle is in fact the leader o f  a political party that 
com m ands the support o f  a majority o f  the members o f  the National 
A ssem bly there is 110 reason to assum e that he should not be 
regarded as a properly appointed Prime M inister.
The King did not d issolve Parliament. But he made reference to the issue in his 
coronation speech on 31 October 1997. He stated that the understanding and 
custom that the K ing’s residence and court are places of  ultimate refuge for all 
those in distress and seeking protection and redress from whatever threats to 
their survival or  freedom  still prevailed amongst the Basotho He observed that 
it was within this understanding that a significant section of the Basotho nation 
had appealed to him to resolve the dispute. The King further stated that, 
though the custom is clear, his powers are defined in the constitution and he 
appealed to the nation to:
show  the w ay forward by indicating the exact role which the Basotho
M onarchy, in the interest o f  all the Basotho, should play (Address by His
M ajesty, K ing L etsie 111, 31 O ctober 1997).
Circumstances under which Parliament may be dissolved are clearly stated in 
the Constitution. T he  Constitution gives the King the power to prorogue or 
dissolve parliament. Section 83 (4) states that "In the exercise of his powers to 
dissolve or p rorogue  Parliament, the King shall act in accordance with the 
advice of  the Prime M inister, provided that:
(a) if  the Prim e M inister recom m ends a dissolution and the King considers that the
G overnm ent o f  L esotho can be carried on without a dissolution and that a 
disso lution  would not be in the interests o f  Lesotho, he m ay, acting in
accordance with the advice o f  the Council o f  State, refuse to dissolve 
Parliament;
if  the National A ssem bly passes a resolution o f  no confidence in the 
Governm ent o f  Lesotho and the Prime M inister does not within three days 
thereafter either resign or advise a dissolution the King m ay, acting in 
accordance with the advice o f  the C ouncil o f  State, d isso lve  Parliament; and
if the o ffice  o f  the Prime M inister is vacant and the King considers that there 
is no prospect o f  his being able within a reasonable time to find a person who 
is the leader o f  a political party or a coalition o f  political parties that will 
com m and the support o f  a majority o f  the m em bers o f  the National Assembly, 
he m ay, acting in accordance with the advice o f  the Council o f  State, dissolve 
Parliament.
The foregoing section o f  the constitution define the boundaries within which 
the King may exercise his power to dissolve parliament and this he has to do 
largely with the advice o f  the Prime Minister. The only exceptions where the 
King may dissolve parliament without the advice o f  the Prime Minister are 
when, as stated in 83 (4) (b) the National Assembly passes a resolution of no 
confidence in the Government and the Prime Minister does not within three 
days resign or advise the King to dissolve Parliament; and when the office of 
Prime Minister is vacant and the King considers that there is no prospect of 
finding a person who is leader o f  a political party or coalition of political 
parties that will command the support o f  a majority o f  the members of the 
National Assembly. In both exceptions the King may dissolve Parliament in 
accordance with the advice o f  the Council o f  State. Yet the dissolution of 
Parliament is not automatic even when the office o f  the Prime Minister falls 
vacant either through a no confidence motion or other reasons. According to 
Section 83 (4) (c) the King may dissolve Parliament if the office of the Prime 
Minister is vacant and:
there is no prospect o f  his being able within a reasonable tim e to find a person 
who is the leader o f  a political party or coalition o f  political parties that will 
com m and the support o f  a majority o f  the m em bers o f  the national Assem bly.
The above section implies that the first step to be taken when the office of the 
Prime Minister falls vacant is to find a successor, and this will be the leader 
o f  a party that commands the support o f  a majority o f  MP.s. It is only when
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it is impossible to find such a person within a reasonable time that the King 
may dissolve Parliament and call for an election.
The resignation o f  India’s Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in May 1996 
further illuminates the principle underlying Lesotho’s constitutional requirement 
in the event o f  any occurrence or episode that necessitates the dissolution of 
parliament. V ajpayee’s party, Bharatiya Janata Party, won the general election 
in April 1996 and formed the government. Thirteen days afterwards, on 28 
May, Vajpayee resigned to avoid a parliamentary vote of no confidence. The 
President o f  India did not dissolve parliament simply because the leader of  the 
party that had won the election had resigned and neither did he ask Vajpayee’s 
deputy in Bharatiya Janata Party to take over as the Prime Minister! Instead he 
invited the United Front coalition leader, Deve Gowda (just hours after 
Vajpayee’s resignation), to form  a new government. The United Front, a 
coalition of 13 socialist and lower-caste political parties, had finished third in 
parliamentary elections in the April election (CNN World News, 29 May 
1996). The United Front had not acquired a majority in the election but by the 
end of May it was com m anding the majority o f  MP.s in Parliament.
A similar incident occurred in the United Kingdom in 1931. The economic 
crisis caused by the Great Depression tore the Labour Government of  Ramsay 
MaCdonald apart. On 24 August 1931 the Labour Cabinet resigned. 
MaCdonald, how ever, continued to serve as a Prime Minister under a newly 
formed National Governm ent. In other words the Labour Party ceased to be 
the ruling party. On 30 September MaCdonald, four other Labour Ministers 
and eleven M P.s supporting  the National Government were expelled from the 
Labour Party following that pa r ty ’s resolution (Keesing’s Contemporary 
Archives, 1931). M aCdonald ceased to be leader o f  the Labour Party and his 
successor, A. Henderson , had been appointed on 28 August 1931. MaCdonald 
and those expelled together with him from the Labour Party formed a new 
party. National Labour Party, in October 1931 (Butler, et al: 235).
MaCdonald had been appointed to the House o t Commons under the Labour 
Party. However, he had been appointed Prime Minister because he was the 
leader of the party with the support o f  the majority MP.s. When his party 
resigned from the governm ent the King did not appoint his successor in the 
Labour Party to form  a new governm ent. The King did not dissolve Parliament 
simply because the new governm ent was no longer led by the leader ot the
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party that had won the election. Instead MaCdonald was allowed to continue 
serving as the Prime Minister because he was able to maintain the support of 
the majority M P.s, and these were few former Labour M P.s, Conservative and 
Liberal MP.s. They passed a vote o f  confidence in him by 309 to 250 votes on 
8 September 1931. The Conservative and Liberal Parties occupied 320 seats 
while the Labour Party’s seats had been reduced to 286 due to M P .s ’ change 
of  allegiance. The Labour Party was thus reduced to the status of the 
opposition despite the fact that it had won the 1929 general election. 
MaCdonald’s new ten member Cabinet was composed o f  four National Labour 
MP.s (former Labour Cabinet Ministers who did not resign), four 
Conservatives and two Liberals.
On the basis o f  the above cases that are similar to the changes in the National 
Assembly o f  Lesotho we conclude that the Prime M inister’s action to form a 
new political party and cross the floor with majority members of the National 
Assembly is not illegal and does not constitute a breach o f  Lesotho’s 
Constitution. Indeed, L esotho’s case is not unique, nor is it a hybrid as the 
anti-Mokhehle coalition wants us to believe. It has its parallels, as 
demonstrated above. Britain’s case is o f  particular importance since the 
argument made by the coalition attempts to show that the Lesotho case deviates 
from the Westminster model.
3. Reasons behind the formation of Lesotho Congress for Democracy
Ntsu M okhehle’s move brought to an end a protracted struggle for power 
within the BCP. W hile there have been clashes within the BCP before, the 
recent conflict is much more significant because it resulted not in the expulsion 
of  few individuals from the party but a split. This section discusses reasons 
behind the BCP split and the resultant formation o f  LCD. These include the 
struggle for power and delivery problems.
The struggle for power within the BCP can be traced back to the 1960s and has 
seen a number of members leave the BCP to form or join other political 
parties. These include Makalo Khaketla, Seepheephe Matete, Charles Dube 
Mofeli (founders o f  Basutoland Freedom Party - BFP, Marematlou Party - 
MTP, and United Democratic Party - UD P respectively). Khaketla and Matete 
merged their parties and formed the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP). Power 
struggle and factionalism within the BCP also resulted in the expulsion of
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Robert Matji, Nettle Ranyali, Nathanael Qhobela, Mpiti Sekake, Phakiso 
Letumanyane and M eshack Poola from the BCP. All of  these were expelled 
from the party in 1964. They all found a political home in the MFP but were 
reduced to obscurity  after their departure from the BCP. The MFP won only 
four seats in 1965 and one seat in the 1970 general elections. Mofeli‘s UDP 
(formed after the 1965 election) did not win a single vote in the 1970 general 
election though it contested three constituencies (Macartney, 1973, 482).
The 1970s were also characterised by factionalism and power struggles within 
the BCP. In 1973 Ntsu M okhehle rejected Jonathan 's  proposal for an Interim 
National Assembly. Part o f  the leadership including G.P Ramoreboli, Phoka 
Chaolana, and twelve others accepted Jonathan 's  nomination. By virtue o f  this 
acceptance they w ere  allegedly deemed to have expelled themselves from the 
party. Ntsu M okhehle and other members o f  the executive committee went into 
exile in 1974 following the B C P ’s abortive uprising against Jonathan’s 
government. While in exile, Tseliso Makhakhe was appointed to the executive 
committee to replace Ramoreboli. A Power struggle within the exiled faction 
led to a split in 1976 when a group led by Tseliso Makhakhe claimed to have 
expelled Ntsu M okhehle from  the position o f  party leader. Tseliso Makhakhe 
was appointed leader o f  the party by his faction.
During the run-up to the 1993 general election attempts were made to reconcile 
different factions. T he  truce between Ram oreboli’s faction and the former 
exiled factions was short lived. Ramoreboli, Chaolana and Khasu walked out 
of the BCP annual conference o f  January 1992 where the executive committee 
was elected for the first time since 1969. They later filed an application with 
the High Court to have the conference proceedings, including the election of 
the executive com m ittee, declared nuli and void. Their complaint was that 
delegations from South A frica ’s Provinces were unconstitutional. When their 
application did not succeed they left the BCP and formed Hareeng Basotho 
Party (Hareeng Basotho Party was, however, formally dissolved in 1997 after 
the BCP split. Its m em bers have rejoined the BCP).
Factionalism and pow er struggle  intensified within the BCP as the election date 
drew closer. By this t ime it had become clear that succession was at the root 
of the problem. Confrontation  ensued between what came to be known as 
Pressure Group and the party leadership. The former was an informal 
voluntary group o f  young party technocrats (academics, civil servants,
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Robert Matji, Nettle Ranyali, Nathanael Qhobela, Mpiti Sekake, Phakiso 
Letumanyane and Meshack Poola from the BCP. All o f  these were expelled 
from the party in 1964. They all found a political home in the MFP hut were 
reduced to obscurity after their departure from the BCP. The MFP won only 
four seats in 1965 and one seat in the 1970 general elections. Mofeli‘s UDP 
(formed after the 1965 election) did not win a single vote in the 1970 general 
election though it contested three constituencies (Macartney, 1973, 482).
The 1970s were also characterised by factionalism and power struggles within 
the BCP. In 1973 Ntsu M okhehle rejected Jonathan 's  proposal for an Interim 
National Assembly. Part o f  the leadership including G .P  Ramoreboli, Phoka 
Chaolana, and twelve others accepted Jo n a th a n s  nomination. By virtue o f  this 
acceptance they were allegedly deemed to have expelled themselves from the 
party. Ntsu Mokhehle and other members o f  the executive committee went into 
exile in 1974 following the B C P ’s abortive uprising against Jonathan’s 
government. While in exile, Tseliso Makhakhe was appointed to the executive 
committee to replace Ramoreboli. A Power struggle within the exiled faction 
led to a split in 1976 when a group led by Tseliso Makhakhe claimed to have 
expelled Ntsu M okhehle from the position o f  party leader. Tseliso Makhakhe 
was appointed leader o f  the party by his faction.
During the run-up to the 1993 general election attempts were made to reconcile 
different factions. T he truce between Ramoreboli\s faction and the former 
exiled factions was short lived. Ramoreboli, Chaolana and Khasu walked out 
of the BCP annual conference o f  January 1992 where the executive committee 
was elected for the first time since 1969. They later filed an application with 
the High Court to have the conference proceedings, including the election of 
the executive committee, declared nuli and void. Their complaint was that 
delegations from South A frica’s Provinces were unconstitutional. When their 
application did not succeed they left the BCP and formed Hareeng Basotho 
Party (Hareeng Basotho Party was, however, formally dissolved in 1997 after 
the BCP split. Its members have rejoined the BCP).
Factionalism and pow er struggle intensified within the BCP as the election date 
drew closer. By this time it had become clear that succession was at the root 
of the  problem. Confrontation ensued between what came to be known as 
Pressure  Group and the party leadership. The former was an informal 
voluntary  group o f  young party technocrats (academics, civil servants,
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managers o f  private and parastatal corporations). The group 's  stated motive 
was to render expert advice to the party, to play the role ot a think tank for 
the party. Indeed this group was solely responsible for the consolidation of  the 
BCP manifesto. Pressure Group was viewed with suspicion by the leadership 
because it did not work within established party structures. In December 1992 
Ntsu Mokhehle wrote a letter to all constituencies censuring the group. After 
the 1993 general election Ntsu Mokhehle became Prime Minister. Expectations 
were that he would be deputised b\ Molapo Qhobela. his deput\ in the party. 
However, this was not the case as Selometsi Baholo became Deputy Prime 
Minister. Baholo was shot and killed by armed military personnel in 1994. He 
was replaced by Professor Pakalitha Mosisili and not Molapo Qhobela. though 
the latter continued to hold the position o f  deputy leader in the p a n s .
In December 1993 a pro-Pressure Group executive committee elected at 
a party conference. This was composed, among others, o f  Molapo Qhobela. 
Tseliso Makhakhe, Ntsukunyane Mphanya, and Sekoala Toloane. It replaced 
a group regarded as Conservatives (Majelathoko) led b\ Shakhane Mokhehle, 
the Prime M inister’s brother. The struggle took an ugly turn as party offices 
were from time to time hijacked and closed to the executive committee by ex- 
LLA cadres ioyal to the anti-Pressure Group faction. \n 3u\y 1994 the entire 
executive committee o f  the Youth League was replaced by new members 
belonging to the Pressure Group. Similarly this was not accepted by the anti- 
Pressure Group faction. The  new committee was denied access to offices. By 
this time the two groups had become so divided that compromise was almost 
impossible. A zero-sum game was being played in competition for leadership 
positions.
In March 1996 the entire executive committee (with the exception of party 
leader whose position is held for five years) was replaced by Majelathoko. 
Also included in the executive committee for the first time was the Deputy 
Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili. He was elected Deputy Leader o f  the party.
The out-going executive committee did not accept the outcome of the 
conference. Four constituencies, overtly supported by this outgoing executive 
committee filed applications with the High Court asking for the proceedings of 
the conference, including the election o f  the incoming executive committee, to 
be declared null and void. These were constituencies o f  Mokhotlong, Khuhelu. 
Thabana Morena and M ohale’s Hoek. They argued (among others) that the
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Free State and Transvaal Provinces, the W om en’s League and Youth League 
were over represented at the conference. The delegations o f  these bodies were 
over those prescribed in the party constitution. The reader will recall that 
Ramoreboli and his colleagues walked out o f  the 1992 annual conference and 
tiled the application with the High Court for the same reason.5 Since 1992 
provincial delegations to annual conferences have been composed in the same 
way.
Though an urgent application by four constituencies was tiled on 14 March 
1996 the court ruled on the case on 25 November 1996. In the meantime the 
struggle climaxed as the two factions openly canvassed against one another and 
washed BCP’s dirty linen in public. On 3 May the Prime Minister removed 
Molapo Qhobela, Tseliso Makhakhe, Ntsukunyane Mphanya and Sekoala 
Toloane from the Cabinet, all members o f  the outgoing executive committee. 
On 14 May two Cabinet Ministers, Khauhelo Raditapole and Moeketsi 
Senaoana, resigned in protest against the dismissal of  their colleagues. On 26 
May the Prime Minister called upon the nation and his supporters to reject the 
dismissed leaders and their colleagues. Both factions organised rallies 
throughout the country where they campaigned against each other. It was clear 
that all those involved intended to fight to the bitter end from within the party. 
They were aware that all those who had left the BCP in the past had failed to 
attract significant following in new parties.
A series of  High Court rulings did not do much to resolve the crisis within the 
BCP. On 25 N ovem ber 1996 Justice Mofolo ruled that the March conference 
had not been conducted procedurally. He declared conference proceedings, 
including the election o f  the new executive committee null and void. He 
entrusted the outgoing executive committee with the responsibility to prepare 
for the party’s annual conference where a new executive committee would be 
elected.
Eventually, following many court rulings, a party conference was held in 
February 1997. However, delegates supportive o f  the Prime Minister walked 
out following his claim that he had been denied access to the conference hall. 
The remaining delegates passed a motion o f  no confidence in Ntsu Mokhehle 
and removed him from  the position o f  party leader. Ntsu Mokhehle sought the 
intervention o f  the High Court on the grounds o f  unlawful expulsion. The court 
nullified the conference decision on 18 April 1997. It, however, declared that
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as Ntsu M okhehle’s five year term had expired in January 1997 he should act 
as interim leader until the election o f  a new leader. The court further ordered 
that such an election should take place within three and a half months of the 
date o f  the judgem ent (CIV /A PN /75/97).
In the meantime the struggle turned hitter and bloody, demonstrating that the 
two factions were irreconcilable. Party vehicles were hijacked by the BCP and 
confiscated from Majelathoko drivers. A BCP emissary was shot dead in one 
o f  these hijacking missions. It was clear that whichever group would finally 
remain in the executive when the dust settled would use the par ty’s disciplinary 
machinery to expel the others as it had happened with Matji, Poola and others 
back in 1964. Cognisant o f  this and the fact that chances o f  winning the 
elections in a conference organised by Qhobela’s faction were minimal, Ntsu 
Mokhehle and his followers devised other strategies. Rather than face 
humiliation o f  losing at the party conference and the opportunity to stand as 
party candidates in the 1998 general election this group decided to leave the 
BCP and form a new political party.
We need to point out, however, that though the BCP resorted to the courts to 
resolve the impasse the split was bound to happen. Courts never solve political 
problems and the split was bound to happen because o f  the long protracted 
struggle for power. Mutual suspicions were so deep that either side felt 
threatened by the other in terms o f  appointments to candidature.
Another factor that contributed to the BCP problems was failure to deliver. 
Lesotho’s turbulent political landscape has been discussed elsewhere (see 
Makoa, 1996) and it rests mainly with the poor economic base. One of the 
critical problems facing Lesotho, according to Makoa, is "chronic economic 
dependence and weak economic base" and these tend to "undermine the 
citizen’s social interaction with and loyalty to the state". A country 
characterised by a poor economy such as that o f  Lesotho is bound to 
experience political and social tensions due to poor delivery. Because of a weak 
economic base the state in Lesotho is not able to accumulate enough resources 
to redistribute among the citizenry in the form of  employment, welfare benefits 
etc. This results in a situation where the majority o f  the people live in poverty 
and squalor while few clamour for the control o f  political parties and 
government so as to be in the position to influence the division of the spoils.
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The 1998 General Election
This section discusses the implications o f  the split within the BCP for the 1998 
general election. T he  split within the BCP has brought to an end a long 
protracted struggle within that party. It has brought a new dimension to the 
nation’s political cleavage and polarisation. It has brought about new forms of 
political competition and rivalry and these will definitely impact on the general 
election. The BCP, like other political parties in Lesotho, has been 
characterised by power struggles and clashes. The most significant o f  these was 
the power struggle that developed in Botswana and led to a purported dismissal 
of Ntsu Mokhehle from the leadership o f  the party. The recent clash that 
occurred within the BCP as a ruling party is much more significant because the 
party has not been able this time to reach a compromise. It is also clear that 
the reconciliation attempted for election purposes before the 1993 general 
election was superfluous.
The BCP split has positive and negative implications and consequences for the 
forthcoming general election. Firstly, the split facilitated a breakthrough in the 
deadlocked negotiations on the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The 
BCP was strongly opposed to the appointment o f  the IEC despite pressure from 
all other political parties. Parties outside government appealed and negotiated 
with the BCP governm ent that the 1998 general election be administered by the 
1EC. But until the split within the then governing party there was no sign that 
the idea would be accepted. Within a week o f  the split, however, the LCD 
government was at the negotiations table with other political parties. The 
outcome was the establishment o f  the IEC. Members o f  the IEC were sworn 
in on Friday 12 September 1997.
The appointment o f  the IEC is indeed a positive move because an independent 
body will dispel suspicions o f  election fraud. There have been allegations of 
election fraud in all general elections since 1965. In 1965 for instance the BCP 
successfully challenged the results o f  two constituencies, ’Masemouse and 
Qaqatu, in the High Court. In 1970 Jonathan nullified the election because o f  
alleged irregularities. In 1993 the BNP challenged the election results in the 
High Court but failed to support its claim (Sekatle, 1995). All political parties 
other than the BCP had proposed that an independent body be set up to 
administer elections in order  to avoid a repeat o f  such claims and allegations 
in future elections.
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Secondly, the split has led to the development o f  openness and preparedness 
to debate party problems by supporters. At the height o f  tension (March 1996 
and 7 June 1997) both factions within the BCP demonstrated willingness to 
debate their problems openly. This is a good sign that all things being equal 
Lesotho’s democracy may prosper.
Thirdly, the split has increased the number o f  major contestants in Lesotho’s 
political landscape. This is certainly a boost to multipartyism and an advantage 
to the electorate who now have more choices. We know that legislatures in 
countries that practise the Westminster type o f  parliamentary democracy with 
its ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system tend to be dominated by two parties. 
However, it is an advantage to have more than two strong political parties 
contesting the election. As indicated by Phororo it is likely that the majority 
o f  constituencies will be won by three political parties, BCP, BNP and LCD.
I would narrow that forecast to two parties, the BCP and LCD. Competition 
is more likely to be between these two parties. There will be more advantages 
should the electoral victory be shared among more than two contestants 
because this will reduce hegemonic tendencies by a majority party.
Fourthly, the BCP split has contributed to a deeper understanding o f  Lesotho’s 
Constitution, particularly the mode of  representation, procedures for the 
appointment and dismissal o f  the Prime Minister, and dissolution of 
Parliament. These have continuously been debated on the media since 9 June 
1997. It can only be hoped that those who are opposed to these practices will 
exert their energies and convince the electorate about the need to modify this 
system. The majority o f  people will participate in the forthcoming general 
election with a better understanding o f  the Constitution and this is indeed a 
positive step in the development o f  representative multiparty democracy.
On the negative side the split within the BCP means that it is unlikely that the 
next general election will be contested on policy issues. In 1993 people wanted 
change so much and they considered the BCP to be the party that would bring 
about that change after decades o f  BNP and military interregnum. The election 
outcome was not so much about promises or agenda for the future. Many 
people were expecting that in the 1998 election this would change and people 
would be influenced by policy issues. However, this will not be the case as 
many BCP and LCD supporters will be influenced by their determination to 
show loyalty to either party. The choice o f  candidates is also going to be
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influenced largely by the question o f  loyalty within these two parties. There are 
some BCP and LCD M P.s who would be rejected in party primary elections 
in their constituencies due to their poor performance. But in an effort to 
maintain and reward loyalty it seems all o f  them will be elected to represent 
their parties in the general election.
Conclusion
The establishment o f  the LCD and the subsequent crossing o f  the floor by a 
majority members o f  the National Assembly to that party in June 1997 brought 
an abrupt and unexpected end to the government o f  the BCP (a political party 
that had won 100% seats in the 1993 general election). This extraordinary 
move was a solution to the power struggle that had afflicted the BCP for a long 
time.
The formation o f  the LC D  and its assumption o f  power generated extensive 
debates on constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy. Ntsu Mokhehle’s 
opponents felt that he had to resign from Premiership as he had been elected 
Prime Minister as leader o f  the BCP. They did not, however, seek the 
intervention o f  the judic iary , the organ best qualified to address such 
grievances. They, instead, attempted to mobilise the nation against Ntsu 
Mokhehle’s governm ent. They sought assistance from foreign diplomatic 
missions in Maseru, S A D C , the United Kingdom and the United States o f  
America. They called on the King to dissolve parliament and set up an interim 
government which would prepare for elections. All these efforts were not 
successful because Ntsu M okhehle’s action does not constitute a breach of  
Lesotho’s Constitution as he "commands the support o f  the majority of  
members o f  the National Assembly".
T’he 8CP split and formation o f  the LCD has both positive and negative 
implications for the 1998 general elections. The most significant negative 
implication is that the 1998 general elections will not be contested on policy 
issues. Supporters o f  both the LCD and the BCP (likely to attract the majority 
of the electorate) will be driven more by the determination to show support and 
loyalty to their respective parties. The choice of candidates for the election will 
also be influenced by considerations o f  loyalty more than merit.
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Some o f  the positive implications are: (1) the establishment o f  the IEC which 
will contribute to a wider acceptance o f  the electoral outcome and reduce 
allegations o f  fraud; (2) an increased number o f  major contestants in Lesotho’s 
political landscape which will effectively boost multipartyism as the electorate 
will have a wider choice.
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